Abstract-We address the problem to control a population of noncooperative heterogeneous agents, each with convex cost function depending on the average population state, and all sharing a convex constraint, towards an aggregative equilibrium. We assume an information structure through which a central coordinator has access to the average population state and can broadcast control signals for steering the decentralized optimal responses of the agents. We design a dynamic control law that, based on operator theoretic arguments, ensures global convergence to an equilibrium independently on the problem data, that are the cost functions and the constraints, local and global, of the agents. We illustrate the proposed method in two application domains: network congestion control and demand side management.
I. INTRODUCTION Motivation:
The problem to coordinate a population of competitive agents arises in several application domains such as the demand side management in the smart grid [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , e.g. for thermostatically controlled loads [6] , [7] , [8] and plug-in electric vehicles [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , demand response in competitive markets [13] , congestion control for networks with shared resources [14] .
The typical challenge in such coordination problems is that the agents are noncooperative, self-interested, yet coupled together, and have local decision authority that if left uncontrolled can lead to undesired emerging population behavior. From the control-theoretic perspective, the objective is to design a coordination law for steering the strategies of the agents towards a noncooperative game equilibrium.
Related literature: Whenever the behavior of each agent is affected by some aggregate effect of all the agents, which is a typical feature of the mentioned application domains, rather than by agent-specific one-to-one effects, aggregative games [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] offer the fundamentals to analyze the strategic interactions between each individual agent and the entire population, although in the classic literature the analysis is limited to agents with scalar decision variable.
For large, in fact in the limit of infinite, population size, aggregative game setups have been considered as deterministic mean field games among agents with strongly convex quadratic cost functions [19] , [20] .
In this paper, we are interested in generalized aggregative games for a population of agents with general convex functions, constrained vector decision variable, and in addition with convex coupling (i.e., shared) constraints.
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Generalized games, that is, games among agents with coupling constraints have been intensively studied in the last decade within the operations research community [21] , [22] and the control systems one [23] , [24] , [25] , [26] in relation with duality theory and variational inequalities.
Assessing the convergence of the dynamic interactions among the noncooperative agents towards an equilibrium is one main challenge that arises in (generalized) games. With this aim, best response dynamics and fictitious play with inertia, i.e., gradient update dynamics, have been analyzed and designed, respectively, both in discrete [27] , [28] and continuous time setups [29] , [30] . In particular, fictitious play with inertia has been introduced to overcome the nonconvergence issue of the best response dynamics [29] . The common feature of these methods is that the agents implement sufficiently small gradient-type steps, each along the direction of optimality for their local problem. Thus, the noncooperative agents shall agree on the sequence of step sizes and exchange truthful information, e.g. with neighboring players, to update their local descent directions. Several distributed algorithms have been proposed for computing the game equilibria, see [31] , [32] , [33] , [34] , [35] and the references therein.
Originality: In this paper, we consider aggregative games among noncooperative agents that do not exchange information, nor agree on variables affecting their local behavior, with the other (competing) agents.
Instead, we assume the presence of a central coordinator that controls the decentralized optimal responses of the competitive agents, via the broadcast of incentive signals common to all of them. Specifically, we design a dynamic control law computing incentives that affect linearly the cost functions of all the agents, simply based on the average among their decentralized optimal responses. The resulting information structure determines the semi-decentralized control architecture illustrated in Figure 1 .
Technically, we wish to control the decentralized optimal responses of the agents towards an aggregative equilibrium, that is, a set of agent strategies that are feasible for both the local and the shared constraints, and individually optimal for each agent, given the strategies of all other agents and the control vector associated with the potential violation of the shared constraints.
Contribution:
The main contributions and novelties of the paper with respect to the literature are summarized next. 
• We discover a nontrivial multivariable mapping with the following two fundamental properties: 1. its unique zero is the incentive signal that generates, via the agents' decentralized optimal responses, the desired equilibrium; 2. there exists a Hilbert space in which the mapping reads as the sum of two monotone operators. Therefore, splitting methods are applicable for computing the zero of such mapping in a semi-decentralized fashion.
• We design a dynamic control law with global convergence guarantee for steering the agents' decentralized optimal responses to the desired equilibrium, with minimal information structure, and with no assumption on the problem data, other than convexity.
• We establish global logarithmic convergence rate under an appropriate selection of the control parameters.
• We show that our approach is applicable to network congestion control and demand side management.
To establish global convergence with minimal information structure, we build upon mathematical tools from variational and convex analysis [36] , and monotone operator theory [37] .
Equilibrium seeking in aggregative games with convex cost functions, convex local constraints and convex coupling constraints has been first studied in [38] , with static control law. In this paper, we enrich the technical setup and study dynamic control laws. Preliminary versions of some technical results in this paper are in [39] where no coupling constraint is considered, and in [40] where the cost functions are assumed to be strongly convex quadratic.
Paper organization: Section II define the aggregative game setup. Section III presents the novel dynamic control law. The main technical results are shown in Section IV and the designed algorithm is discussed in Section V. Section VI illustrates our approach via numerical simulations. Section VII concludes the paper and points at several research avenues. Some proofs are provided in the Appendix. Notation R, R >0 , R ≥0 respectively denote the set of real, positive, and non-negative real numbers; R := R ∪ {∞}; N denotes the set of natural numbers; for a, b ∈ N, a ≤ b,
. . , A M ) denotes the block diagonal matrix with A 1 , . . . , A M in block diagonal positions; given scalars a 1 , . . . , a M , we use the notation vec (a i )
M . With S n we denote the set of symmetric n × n matrices; for a given Q ∈ S n , the notations Q 0 (Q 0) and Q ∈ S n 0 (Q ∈ S n 0 ) denote that Q is symmetric and has positive (non-negative) eigenvalues. I denotes the identity matrix; 0 (1) denotes a matrix/vector with all elements equal to 0 (1); to improve clarity, we may add the dimension of these matrices/vectors as subscript. A ⊗ B denotes the Kronecker product between matrices A and B. Every mentioned set S ⊆ R n is meant to be nonempty.
The notation dist (x, S) := inf y∈S x − y denotes the distance of a vector x ∈ R n from a set S ⊆ R n . Operator theoretic notations and definitions: H Q , with Q ∈ S n 0 , denotes the Hilbert space R n with inner product x, y Q := x Qy and induced norm x Q := x Qx, for all x, y ∈ R n ; we refer to the Hilbert space H I whenever not specified otherwise. Given a function f :
denotes its subdifferential set-valued mapping [36] , defined as
for all x, y ∈ R n ; it is firmly nonexpansive (hence strictly monotone and nonexpansive) if it is 1 2 -averaged; it is β-cocoercive (hence strictly monotone), with β ∈ R >0 , if the mapping β T (·) is firmly nonexpansive.
II. AGGREGATIVE GAMES WITH COUPLING CONSTRAINTS
We consider a population of N agents, where each agent i ∈ N[1, N ] has strategy (i.e., decision variable) x i ∈ X i ⊂ R n , and all share the constraint
for some set S ⊆
We assume that each agent i ∈ N[1, N ] aims at minimizing its local cost function J i , which depends on the average among the strategies of all other agents, and in particular at seeking a strategy x i such that
where the argument λ ∈ R n represents a control vector that the coordinator agent, introduced later on, can impose on the agents to avoid the violation of the coupling constraint in (1) . Equations (1)- (2) define a competitive aggregative game. We have an aggregative game since the optimal strategy of each agent depends on the average among the strategies of all agents; the game is competitive aggregative since the cost functions of the agents all depend on a common vector λ associated with the coupling constraint in aggregative form.
Throughout the paper, we assume compactness, convexity and Slater's qualification [41, §5.2.3] of both the individual and the shared constraints, and strong convexity of the cost functions, with linear dependence on the global coupling variable. Such basic assumptions ensure existence of an equilibrium, and that the agents' optimal responses, defined formally in Section III-A, are single-valued and continuous. 
for some function f i : R n → R continuous and -strongly convex, with ∈ R >0 , C ∈ S n , and invertible K ∈ S n .
In (3), the matrix C in (3) weights the influence of the average among the agents' strategies on each cost function J i , whereas the matrix K in (3) weights the effect of the vector λ. In the remainder of the paper, we consider C as part of the given problem data, while K as design choice for the coordinator of the game.
Our goal is to control the strategies of the agents to an aggregative equilibrium, that is, a set of strategies and control vector such that: the coupling constraint in (1) is satisfied, and each agent's strategy is optimal given the strategies of all other agents and the control vector.
,λ is an aggregative equilibrium for the game in (2) with coupling constraint in (1) 
We formalize next that an aggregative equilibrium exists under the postulated standing assumptions.
Proposition 1: Existence of an aggregative equilibrium. There exists an aggregative equilibrium for the game in (2) with coupling constraint in (1).
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 1: Non-uniqueness of aggregative equilibria. Uniqueness of the aggregative equilibrium does not necessarily hold. For instance, consider the game with following problem data:
. The pairs ((1, 1), 0) and ((−1, −1), 0) are aggregative equilibria, independently on the choice of K in (3). Selecting the best aggregative equilibrium from a global optimization perspective goes beyond the purpose of this paper.
To conclude the section, we note that in the limit of infinite population size, an aggregative equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium with fixed control vector.
Theorem 1: Aggregative equilibrium versus Nash equilibrium. Let the pair (
,λ be an aggregative equilibrium, and define
Assume that there exists a compact set X ⊂ R n such that
Proof: See Appendix B.
III. DYNAMIC CONTROL OF THE AGENTS' DECENTRALIZED OPTIMAL RESPONSES

A. Fixed points of the aggregation mapping
For seeking an aggregative equilibrium, we assume that an agent i cannot exchange information, nor has prior knowledge, on the strategies of all other (competing) agents. Instead, we assume that each individual agent responds optimally to incentive signals u ∈ R n according to the information structure in Figure 1 . Formally, for all i ∈ N[1, N ], we define the agent optimal response mapping x i : R n → X i as
and the aggregation mapping A :
as the average among the optimal responses of agents to the incentive signal u(σ, λ) = Cσ + Kλ, i.e.,
Note that ifσ = A σ,λ for someλ ∈ R n , thenσ = 1 N N i=1x i , with shorthand notationx i := x i (Cσ + Kλ). It follows immediately from Proposition 1 that such a pair (σ,λ) exists; uniqueness depends however on the choice of K as established later in Proposition 2, Section IV.
,λ is in fact an aggregative equilibrium. It follows that we can control the agents' optimal responses, e.g. via dynamic updates of their argument, to a set of strategies whose average is a fixed point of the aggregation mapping (with respect to the first argument) within the coupling constraint set.
B. From fixed points to zeros
Informally speaking, the objective is to find a pair (σ,λ) such thatσ = A(σ,λ) = x 0 , for some x 0 ∈ S. Since A depends on two arguments, it follows naturally that x 0 is designed as a mapping that depends on the same arguments. With this aim, we translate the problem into that of finding a zero of an appropriate multivariable mapping via semidecentralized iterations.
Among all possible design choices, let us define the mapping
Remarkably, we notice that a pair σ,λ satisfiesσ = A σ,λ = x 0 (σ,λ) ∈ S if σ ;λ is a zero of the mapping
where the matrix gain K is to be chosen, and we defined the matrix M ∈ R 2n×2n and the mapping Γ :
C. Dynamic control as zero finding algorithm In general, computing a zero of a multivariable nonlinear mapping such as Θ = M + Γ in (7) is a challenging task. However, for the sum of monotone mappings there exist iterative algorithms with global convergence guarantee [37, Chapter 25] . Inspired by the forward-backward algorithm [37, Equation 25 .26], we propose the dynamic control law κ in ( * ) for computing a zero of Θ = M + Γ in (7), where > 0 is sufficiently small and the averaging step sizes (α t ) ∞ t=0 are chosen as follows.
Design choice 1: The sequence (α t ) ∞ t=0 in ( * ) is such that α t ∈ (0, 3/2) for all t ∈ N and ∞ t=0 α t 3 2 − α t = ∞. Suitable choices for the sequence (α t ) t∈N that satisfy the design condition stated above are α t = 1 and α t = 1/(t + 1), for all t ∈ N. The proposed dynamic control scheme is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Dynamic control of the decentralized optimal responses by the competitive agents.
Iterate until convergence:
• The coordinator broadcasts
to all agents, and computes x 0 σ (t) , λ (t) from (6).
• The agents compute in parallel
• The coordinator receives A σ (t) , λ (t) as in (5), (9), and from ( * )
IV. GLOBAL CONVERGENCE
A. Statement of the main results
The mapping Θ in (7) reads as the sum of the linear, hence continuous, mapping M · and the mapping Γ(·) in (9) . With the aim of applying [37, Theorem 25.8] , in the following we show that by choosing the matrix gain K in (4) appropriately, M is monotone and Γ is β-cocoercive, that is, β Γ(·) is firmly nonexpansive, in some Hilbert space. Consequently, we derive a dynamic control law that ensures global convergence of the controlled decentralized optimal responses to a set of strategies whose average is a fixed point of the aggregation mapping with respect to its first argument.
Design choice 2:
The matrix K in (7) is chosen such that K 0 and C + K 0.
Theorem 2: Monotonicity. Under design choice 2, the linear mapping M in (8) is monotone in H P , and the mapping Γ in (9) is β-cocoercive, hence strictly monotone, in H P , where
Proof: See Section IV-B.
Proposition 2: Existence and uniqueness. Under design choice 2, ∃! σ ;λ ∈ zer (Θ), with Θ as in (7) . Design choice 3: The constant in ( * ) is such that ∈ (0, β), with β in (10).
Theorem 3: Global convergence. Under design choices 1-3, the sequence σ (t) ; λ (t) ∞ t=0 defined in ( * ) converges, for any initial condition, to the zero of Θ in (7), with A as in (5) and x i as in (4) We conclude the subsection by quantifying the global convergence rate. Since in general this might depend on the chosen sequence (α t ) t∈N , let us focus on the case α t =ᾱ ∈ (0, 1) for all t ∈ N, for which we establish global logarithmic convergence rate.
Theorem 4: Global logarithmic convergence rate. Under design choices 2-4, the sequence σ (t) , λ (t) ∞ t=0 defined in ( * ) is such that, for all t ∈ N and any initial condition,
where Θ is as in (7), P as in (10) , A as in (5) and
Proof: See Section IV-C.
Corollary 1: Global convergence to an aggregative equilibrium. Under design choices 2-4, for any initial condition, the sequence (
defined from (4) and ( * ) converges with the logarithmic rate in (11) to an aggregative equilibrium for the game in (2) with coupling constraint in (1).
Proof: It follows immediately from Theorems 3-4.
B. Proof of Theorem 2 (Monotonicity)
We proceed with two statements that are exploited later on.
Lemma 1: If a function f : R n → R is -strongly convex, ∈ R >0 , then: ∂f is -strongly monotone, and (∂f ) 
−1 (y), such that x ∈ ∂f (ξ), y ∈ ∂f (ζ), and hence
Lemma 2: Let the function f : R n → R be -strongly convex, ∈ R >0 . Then for any A ∈ R n×m , the mapping
is ( A / )-Lipschitz continuous.
Proof: By Lemma 1 the mapping (∂f )
n . The second equation in (12) follows by applying (∂f ) −1 to both sides of the last inclusion.
It follows from Lemma 2 that, for all i ∈ N[1, N ], the optimal response from (4) reads as
and analogously, the mapping x 0 in (6) reads as
where f 0 (y) := 1 2 y y + δ S (y). In view of Γ in (9) , for all i ∈ N[1, N ], let us define the mapping
Note that the mapping diag ∂f i , ∂f 0 is γ-strongly monotone with γ := min{ , 1}, thus the mapping diag (
in (13) is γ-cocoercive and (1/γ)-Lipschitz continuous due to Lemma 1 and [37, Proposition 20.23] . In the rest of the proof, we exploit the following result, which is a variant of [37, Proposition 4.5].
Lemma 3: Let M : R m → R m be a γ-cocoercive mapping, γ ∈ R >0 , and A, B ∈ R m×m be invertible matrices. If
Proof
We now apply Lemma 3 to the mapping Γ i (·) in (13). Namely, we consider m = 2n and the matrices
and derive
where > 0 is chosen such that C + (1 − )K 0. Since
0 and C ∈ S n , K 0 and C + K 0 ensure that B is invertible and A − B 0. By Lemma 3, this implies that, for
Since all the mappings
are strictly monotone in H P , it follows that Γ is strictly monotone as well [36, Exercise 12.4 (c) 
in (13) Proof: Since M is (strictly) monotone, for all x = y ∈ R m , we have:
C. Dynamic control as fixed point iteration: Proof of Theorem 4 (Global logarithmic convergence rate)
The iteration in ( * ) can be written as the fixed point iteration
where the mapping T : R 2n → R 2n is defined as
In fact, a vectorz ∈ R 2n is a fixed point of T if and only if, for all α > 0, it is fixed point of the mapping (1 − α)Id + αT , and if and only if it is a zero of M + Γ [38, Lemma 1] 
, which is equivalent to Mz + Γ(z) = 0.
To establish the convergence rate of the iteration in ( * ) with α t =ᾱ ∈ (0, 1] for all t ∈ N, we show that the mappings T in (14) and
are averaged operators.
Lemma 5: The mapping T in (14) is 2 3 -averaged in H P , and the mapping K in (15) is (1−ᾱ 3 )-averaged in H P , with P as in (10) . We can now prove Theorem 4. Proof: By the definition of averaged operator, we have that
2 P for all x, y ∈ R 2n , where β = 2/3 in view of Lemma 5. Let us take x = z (τ ) := σ (τ ) ; λ (τ ) , and y =z = K(z). By substituting, we obtain
, and equivalently
. Now, we sum up over τ ∈ N[0, t] and derive
, which completes the proof. Finally, we note that the mapping T is nonexpansive according to Lemma 5, hence several fixed point iterations have global convergence guarantee. The design choice α t :=ᾱ ∈ (0, 1) for all t ∈ N is known as Krasnoselskij iteration [20, Equation (18) ]. Among other iterations, we mention the Mann iteration [20, Equation (20) ], which corresponds to choosing the sequence (α t ) t∈N such that α t ∈ [0, 1] for all t ∈ N, lim t→∞ α t = ∞, and ∞ t=0 α t = ∞, e.g. α t := 1/(t + 1) for all t ∈ N.
V. DISCUSSION A. Features of the dynamic control scheme
One computational feature of the iteration in ( * ) is that it only requires one-to-all coordination between a central computer and the decentralized, hence parallelizable, optimal responses (
in (4) of the agents, as summarized in Algorithm 1. Each decentralized computation consists in solving a finite dimensional strongly convex optimization problem, for which efficient algorithms are available. Note that at each iteration t only one vector in R n is broadcast, independently on the population size N , which can be arbitrarily large. Also note that the coordinator needs access to the aggregate information A only, not necessarily to the entire set of optimal responses.
The main distinctive feature of the proposed semidecentralized architecture is that the central coordinator can decide on the step sizes (α t ) ∞ t=0 and , on the gain K, and on the stopping criterion for the iteration in ( * ). Therefore, the agents can simply behave as fully noncooperative, in the sense that in addition to being self-interested, they do not have to exchange information with each other, nor to agree on the step sizes associated with the control signals, nor on the stopping criterion. Each of these agreement points would be in fact exposed to malicious agent behavior. Also, for the convergence of the dynamic iterations, neither the central coordinator nor the agents need to know the population size N .
In summary, Algorithm 1 is such that:
• the central coordinator keeps the information on the chosen incentive mechanism and on the global coupling constraint private; • the noncooperative agents keep information on their cost functions and local constraints private.
B. Generalized Nash aggregative games
The game setup in (1)- (2) can be related to the generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) with best responses
for all i ∈ N[1, N ], where
and the shared constraint set for agent i reads as
Due to the aggregative structure of both the cost functions and the shared constraint, let us label such a game as generalized Nash aggregative game. 
i ∈ S can be written as
for some convex, differentiable functions g and
. Then, we introduce an additional agent that controls the dual variable λ ∈ R m associated with the shared constraint, and let each agent minimize its own Lagrangian function. Specifically, we derive the following (non-generalized) NEP among N + 1 agents with no coupling constraint [44, Part II, Equation (3.2)]:
It then follows from [22, Theorem 8] that, under basic regularity assumptions, an NE (x, λ) for the game without coupling constraint (17) is such that x is a GNE for the game with coupling constraint in (16) . We note that in (17) the best response for x i is similar to that in (2), while the best response for λ has no clear counterpart in ( * ).
For the computation of an NE for (17) several distributed algorithms are available, see e.g. [44, Part II, §2], or follow from solution algorithms for monotone variational inequalities [21, §12] . We note that all such computational algorithms require differentiable cost and coupling constraint functions and that the so-called game (or pseudo gradient) mapping
for (17) is (strongly) monotone in some Hilbert space. However, monotonicity of the game mapping does not hold in general [22, §5.2] , not even with convex problem data. Even in the aggregative game setup in (1)- (2), or in (16), Standing Assumptions 1-2 do not imply that the game mapping is monotone either. We finally mention that, since C ∈ S n , it can be shown that the GNEP in (16) is a generalized potential game (GPG) [45, Definition 2.1]. Thus, regularized Gauss-Siedel algorithms are applicable for computing a GNE, e.g. [45, Algorithms 2, 3] , as monotonicity of the game mapping is not required.
C. Generalized projected dynamical systems
The problem to control the decentralized optimal responses of the agents to an equilibrium in Section II can be interpreted as the design of a dynamic output-feedback control law u(t) = [C, K] κ(t, y(t)) for the following discrete-time system:
In particular, the control objective is to drive the output y to someȳ ∈ S and the states to an equilibriumx
are strongly convex quadratic, the arg min dynamics in (18a) read as projection dynamics.
, where the projection operator is defined as proj
Consequently, (18a) is a discrete-time projected dynamical system [46] , [47] where we wish to close the feedback loop with some
For general strongly convex functions as in Standing Assumption 2, it follows from Lemma 2 that in (18a) we have
is strictly monotone and Lipschitz continuous according to Lemma 1. Since the stability analysis for projected dynamical systems builds upon the fact that the projection onto a convex set is a firmly nonexpansive (hence strictly monotone and 1-Lipschitz continuous) mapping, our analysis based on monotone operator theory is applicable to generalized projected dynamical systems with strongly convex non-quadratic functions.
VI. APPLICATIONS
The considered aggregative game setup with coupling constraints is applicable to the dynamic management of noncooperative agents coupled in aggregative form. Applications include network congestion control [14] , demand response in competitive markets [13] and demand side management for prosumers in the smart grid, e.g. residential loads with coupling constraints [3] , [48] , and smart homes with shared renewable energy sources [49] . The common feature of all these setups is in fact the presence of a population of competitive agents with convex cost functions, convex local and shared constraints, coupled together in aggregative form as in (1)-(2). In the next subsections, we focus on two such applications.
A. Network congestion control with capacity constraints
We consider the problem faced by a network manager to control the flow demands of a large set of noncooperative users by dynamically pricing the network capacity [14] .
General problem setup: The network is characterized by a set of edges E := N[1, n], with capacity c := [c 1 ; . . . ; c n ] ∈ R n >0 . Each user i ∈ N[1, N ] aims at selecting its flow profile x i ∈ R n that minimizes its disutility function, that is coupled in aggregative form to the flow profiles of all other agents. Specifically, each user i aims at minimizing the cost function
where [14, Sections III-IV] the function f i , that is continuous and convex, represents the intrinsic disutility, the function c(·) = [c 1 (·); . . . ; c n (·)] represents the flow-unit delay cost (disutility) experienced by the users over the edges, λ ∈ R n is the congestion price, that is, the penalty vector associated with the coupling network-capacity constraint
Each user i also has a local constraint set X i that represents its individual routing policy per flow unit.
Illustrative scenario with fixed routing policy: In the following, we simulate the scenario illustrated in [14, Section IV.B], where fixed routing policies are considered. Namely, each agent i has a routing policy x i = a i ξ i , for some scalar ξ i ≥ 0, and some fixed vector a i ∈ R n ≥0 such that 1 a i = 1. As in [14, Section IV.B], for each user i, we use the convex, nonquadratic, intrinsic disutility function f i (ξ i ) := −20 ln(1+ξ i ). Affine approximation of the delay cost: Next we derive an affine approximation for the delay mapping c(·), based on the function c e (·) = 1/(β e − ·) from [14] , for each edge e ∈  N[1, N ] . We use the first order Taylor approximation around the origin, hence in (19) we consider the delay cost mapping
Note that the matrix diag 1/β 2 e n e=1 0 corresponds to the matrix C in the cost-function structure in (3), hence any matrix gain K 0 satisfies the design choice 2.
Numerical simulations: We use some numerical parameters from [14, Tables I, II N ] . We tune the gains of the dynamic control law κ in ( * ) as α = 1, K = I, and choose that satisfy the design choice 3. We take as initial condition λ (0) = 0 and random σ (0) , uniformly distributed within the coupling constraint set. Finally, as convergence criteria, we consider that Θ [σ (t) ; λ (t) ] must be less than certain tolerance values. We run several numerical experiments, each with randomly selected routing policies
and initial condition σ (0) . Figure 2 shows the convergence scenario for 10 3 experiments, with N = 10 4 agents. Figure 3 shows the convergence scenarios parametric on the population size, where 10 2 experiments are run for each value of N . We conclude that the population size does not affect the convergence speed.
B. Charging coordination for plug-in electric vehicles with transmission line constraints
We consider the problem to control the charging schedule of a population of plug-in electric vehicles subject to transmission line constraints [50] , [51] . i , while minimizing its individual disutility, subject to individual and shared charging constraints, over a charging horizon that is here discretized into n = 14 time intervals. The nominal values of the numerical parameters defining the cost functions and the charging constraints are taken from [52] , and then are randomized as in [12] to emulate the population variability. For each PEV agent i ∈ N[1, N ], we consider the quadratic cost function . We illustrate the proposed algorithm with capacities c j = 0.04 if j ∈ {1, 2, 12, 13, 14}, 0.1 otherwise, to represent more restrictive charging limitations during the day time.
Numerical simulations: We tune the gains of the dynamic control law in ( * ) as α = 1, K = 0.05I, and then choose according to the design choice 3. We take as initial condition λ (0) = 0 and random σ (0) , uniformly distributed within the shared constraint set. Finally, as convergence criteria we consider that Θ [σ (t) ; λ (t) ] shall be less than certain tolerance values. We run several numerical experiments, each with the mentioned randomly selected parameters and initial condition. Figure 4 shows the sum between the normalized average inflexible demand and the average among the charging strategies at the equilibrium, i.e., the optimal responses in (4), for 10 2 experiments with N = 10 4 agents; Figure 5 shows the convergence scenario for 10
3 experiments. Figure 6 shows the convergence scenarios parametric on the population size, where 10 2 experiments are run for each value of N . Also for this application, we conclude that the population size does not affect the convergence speed of the proposed algorithm.
VII. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
We have addressed the problem to control a population of competitive agents, with convex cost functions coupled together via the average population state, convex local and coupling constraints, towards an aggregative equilibrium. Our technical results allow us to design a model-free dynamic control law with global convergence guarantee, with no assumption on the problem data, other than strong convexity and compactness. The numerical simulations show that the proposed algorithm achieves an aggregative equilibrium within a reasonable number of iterations independently on the population size.
This paper can be extended in several directions, including those outlined next.
• Stochasticity: We have not considered agents with probabilistic constraints. Such an extension would be valuable for the analysis and control of decentralized optimal decisions under stochastic uncertainty. One possible approach is to solve a deterministic approximation of the stochastic game, and then conclude about the computed solution in probabilistic terms. design choices for the control parameters. To maximize the convergence speed, the parameters shall be appropriately selected, e.g. optimally with respect to some convergence rate estimate. The connection with multi-agent dynamics in cooperative optimization is currently an active area of research [53] , [54] . 
converges to x 0 (σ), x (σ), λ σ , for an opportune choice of the sequence ( t ) ∞ t=0 , where x 0 (σ); x (σ) denotes the optimal solution to P(σ). Moreover, by Slater's constraint qualification in Standing Assumption 1, there exists a unique optimal dual multiplier λ σ ∈ R n [41, Section 5.2.3, p. 227].
We now define x 1 ; . . . ;x N := x (σ) andλ := λ σ , so that at convergence (i.e., as t → ∞) by (22b) we havē x i = arg min y∈X i J i y, 
To conclude the proof, we introduce the shorthand notation v := −Cσ − Kλ and v i := −C(σ − Remark 2: Theorem 1 immediately implies that the difference between the optimal cost at an aggregative equilibrium and that at a Nash equilibrium vanishes in the limit of infinite population size, that is, whenever ( 
